Abstract. We consider two-player games played over finite state spaces for an infinite number of rounds. At each state, the players simultaneously choose moves; the moves determine a successor state. It is often advantageous for players to choose probability distributions over moves, rather than single moves. Given a goal (e.g., "reach a target state"), the question of winning is thus a probabilistic one: "what is the maximal probability of winning from a given state?".
Introduction
We consider two-player games played for an infinite number of rounds over finite state spaces. At each round, the players simultaneously and independently select moves; the moves then determine a probability distribution over successor states. These games, known variously as stochastic games [27] or concurrent games [5, 1, 7] , generalize many common structures in computer science, from transition systems, to Markov chains [15] and Markov decision processes [8] . The games are turn-based if, at each state, at most one of the players has a choice of moves, and deterministic if the successor state is uniquely determined by the current state, and by the moves chosen by the players.
It is well-known that in such games with simultaneous moves it is often advantageous for the players to randomize their moves, so that at each round, they play not a single "pure" move, but rather, a probability distribution over the available moves. These probability distributions over moves, called mixed moves [23] , lead to various notions of equilibria [32, 23] , such as the equilibrium result expressed by the minimax theorem [32] . Intuitively, the benefit of playing mixed, rather than pure, moves lies in preventing the adversary from tailoring a response to the individual move played. Even for simple reachability games, the use of mixed moves may allow players to win, with probability 1, games that they would lose (i.e., win with probability 0) if restricted to playing pure moves [5] . With mixed moves, the question of winning a game with respect to a goal is thus a probabilistic one: what is the maximal probability a player can be guaranteed of winning, regardless of how the other player plays? This probability is known, in brief, as the winning probability.
In structures ranging from transition systems to Markov decision processes and games, a fundamental question is the one of equivalence of states. Given a suitably large class Φ of properties, containing all properties of interest to the modeler, two states are equivalent if the same properties hold in both states. For a property ϕ, denote the value of ϕ at s by ϕ(s): in the case of games, this might represent the maximal probability of a player winning with respect to a goal expressed by ϕ. Two states s and t are equivalent if ϕ(s) = ϕ(t) for all ϕ ∈ Φ. For (finite-branching) transition systems, and for the class of properties Φ expressible in the µ-calculus [17] , state equivalence is captured by bisimulation [22] ; for Markov decision processes, it is captured by probabilistic bisimulation [25] . For quantitative properties, a notion related to equivalence is that of a metric: a metric provides a tight bound for how much the value of a property can differ at states of the system, and provides thus a quantitative notion of similarity between states. Given a set Φ of properties, the metric distance of two states s and t can be defined as sup ϕ∈Φ |ϕ(s) − ϕ(t)|. Metrics for Markov decision processes have been studied in [9, 30, 31, 10, 11] . Obviously, the metrics and relations are connected, in the sense that the relations are the kernels of the metrics (the pairs of states having metric distance 0). The metrics and relations are at the heart of many verification techniques, from approximate reasoning (one can substitute states that are close in the metric) to system reductions (one can collapse equivalent states) to compositional reasoning and refinement (providing a notion of substitutivity of equivalents).
We introduce metrics and equivalence relations for concurrent games, with respect to the class of properties Φ expressible in the quantitative µ-calculus [7, 21] . We claim that these metrics and relations represent the canonical extension of bisimulation to games. We also introduce asymmetrical versions of these metrics and equivalences, which constitute the canonical extension of simulation.
GAME REFINEMENT RELATIONS AND METRICS 3
An equivalence relation for deterministic games that are either turn-based, or where the players are constrained to playing pure moves, has been introduced in [2] and called alternating bisimulation. Relations and metrics for the general case of concurrent games have so far proved elusive, with some previous attempts at their definition by a subset of the authors following a subtly flawed approach [6, 19] . The cause of the difficulty goes to the heart of the definition of bisimulation. In the definition of bisimulation for transition systems, for every pair s, t of bisimilar states, we require that if s can go to a state s ′ , then t should be able to go to t ′ , such that s ′ and t ′ are again bisimilar (we also ask that s, t have an equivalent predicate valuation). This definition has been extended to Markov decision processes by requiring that for every mixed move from s, there is a mixed move from t, such that the moves induce probability distributions over successor states that are equivalent modulo the underlying bisimulation [25, 24] . Unfortunately, the generalization of this appealing definition to games fails. It turns out, as we prove in this paper, that requiring players to be able to replicate probability distributions over successors (modulo the underlying equivalence) leads to an equivalence that is too fine, and that may fail to relate states at which the same quantitative µ-calculus formulas hold. We show that phrasing the definition in terms of distributions over successor states is the wrong approach for games; rather, the definition should be phrased in terms of expectations of certain metric-bounded quantities.
Our starting point is a closer look at the definition of metrics for Markov decision processes. We observe that we can manipulate the definition of metrics given in [31] , obtaining an alternative form, which we call the a priori form, in contrast with the original form of [31] , which we call the a posteriori form. Informally, the a posteriori form is the traditional definition, phrased in terms of similarity of probability distributions; the a priori form is instead phrased in terms of expectations. We show that, while on Markov decision processes these two forms coincide, this is not the case for games; moreover, we show that it is the a priori form that provides the canonical metrics for games.
We prove that the a priori metric distance between two states s and t of a concurrent game is equal to sup ϕ∈Φ |ϕ(s) − ϕ(t)|, where Φ is the set of properties expressible via the quantitative µ-calculus. This result can be summarized by saying that the quantitative µ-calculus provides a logical characterization for the a priori metrics, similar to the way the ordinary µ-calculus provides a logical characterization of bisimulation. Furthermore, we prove that a priori metrics -and their kernels, the a priori relations -satisfy a reciprocity property, stating that properties expressed in terms of player 1 and player 2 winning conditions have the same distinguishing power. This property is intimately connected to the fact that concurrent games, played with mixed moves, are determined for ω-regular goals [20, 7] : the probability that player 1 achieves a goal ψ is one minus the probability that player 2 achieves the goal ¬ψ. Reciprocity ensures that there is one, canonical, notion of game equivalence. This is in contrast to the case of alternating bisimulation of [2] , in which there are distinct player 1 and player 2 versions, as a consequence of the fact that concurrent games, when played with pure moves, are not determined. The logical characterization and reciprocity result justify our claim that a priori metrics and relations are the canonical notion of metrics, and equivalence, for concurrent games. Neither the logical characterization nor the reciprocity result hold for the a posteriori metrics and relations.
While this introduction focused mostly on metrics and equivalence relations, we also develop results for the asymmetrical versions of these notions, related to simulation.
Games and Goals
We will develop metrics for game structures over a set S of states. We start with some preliminary definitions. For a finite set A, let Dist(A) = {p : A → [0, 1] | a∈A p(a) = 1} denote the set of probability distributions over A. We say that p ∈ Dist(A) is deterministic if there is a ∈ A such that p(a) = 1.
For a set S, a valuation over S is a function f : S → [0, 1] associating with every element s ∈ S a value 0 ≤ f (s) ≤ 1; we let F be the set of all valuations. For c ∈ [0, 1], we denote by c the constant valuation such that c(s) = c at all s ∈ S. We order valuations pointwise: for f, g ∈ F, we write f ≤ g iff f (s) ≤ g(s) at all s ∈ S; we remark that F, under ≤, forms a complete lattice.
Given a, b ∈ IR, we write a ⊔ b = max{a, b}, and a ⊓ b = min{a, b}; we also let a⊕ b = min{1, max{0, a+ b}} and a⊖ b = max{0, min{1, a− b}}. We extend ⊓, ⊔, +, −, ⊕, ⊖ to valuations by interpreting them in pointwise fashion.
A directed metric is a function d :
for all s, t, u ∈ S. We denote by M ⊆ S 2 → IR the space of all metrics; this space, ordered pointwise, forms a lattice which we indicate with (M, ≤). Given a metric d ∈ M, we denote byd its opposite version, defined byd(s, t) = d(t, s) for all s, t ∈ S; we say that d is symmetrical if d =d. • A finite set Moves of moves.
• Two move assignments Γ 1 , Γ 2 : S → 2 Moves \∅. For i ∈ {1, 2}, the assignment Γ i associates with each state s ∈ S the nonempty set Γ i (s) ⊆ Moves of moves available to player i at state s.
• A probabilistic transition function δ: S × Moves × Moves → Dist(S), that gives the probability δ(s, a 1 , a 2 )(t) of a transition from s to t when player 1 plays move a 1 and player 2 plays move a 2 . At every state s ∈ S, player 1 chooses a move a 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s), and simultaneously and independently player 2 chooses a move a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s). The game then proceeds to the successor state t ∈ S with probability δ(s, a 1 , a 2 )(t). We denote by Dest(s, a 1 , a 2 ) = {t ∈ S | δ(s, a 1 , a 2 )(t) > 0} the set of destination states when actions a 1 , a 2 are chosen at s. The variables in V naturally induce an equivalence on states: for states s, t, define s ≡ t if for all v ∈ V we have [v](s) = [v](t). In the following, unless otherwise noted, the definitions refer to a game structure with components G = S, [·], Moves, Γ 1 , Γ 2 , δ . For player i ∈ {1, 2}, we write ∼i = 3 − i for the opponent. We also consider the following subclasses of game structures.
• Turn-based game structures. A game structure G is turn-based if we can write S as the disjoint union of two sets: the set S 1 of player 1 states, and the set S 2 of player 2 states, such that s ∈ S 1 implies |Γ 2 (s)| = 1, and s ∈ S 2 implies |Γ 1 (s)| = 1, and further, there is a special variable turn ∈ V, such that [turn](s) = 1 iff s ∈ S 1 , and [turn](s) = 0 iff s ∈ S 2 : thus, the variable turn indicates whose turn it is to play at a state.
• Markov decision processes. A game structure G is a Markov decision process (MDP) [8] if only one of the two players has a choice of moves. For i ∈ {1, 2}, we say that a structure is an i-MDP if ∀s ∈ S, |Γ ∼i (s)| = 1. For MDPs, we omit the (single) move of the player without a choice of moves, and write δ(s, a) for the transition function. • Deterministic game structures. A game structure G is deterministic if, for all s ∈ S, a 1 ∈ Moves, and a 2 ∈ Moves, there exists a t ∈ S such that δ(s, a 1 , a 2 )(t) = 1; we denote such t by τ (s, a 1 , a 2 ). We sometimes call probabilistic a general game structure, to emphasize the fact that it is not necessarily deterministic. Note that MDPs can be seen as turn-based games by setting [turn] = 1 for 1-MDPs and [turn] = 0 for 2-MDPs. Pure and mixed moves. A mixed move is a probability distribution over the moves available to a player at a state. We denote by D i (s) = Dist(Γ i (s)) the set of mixed moves available to player i ∈ {1, 2} at s ∈ S. The moves in Moves are called pure moves, in contrast to mixed moves. We extend the transition function to mixed moves. For s ∈ S and x 1 ∈ D 1 (s), x 2 ∈ D 2 (s), we write δ(s, x 1 , x 2 ) for the next-state probability distribution induced by the mixed moves x 1 and x 2 , defined for all t ∈ S by
In the following, we sometimes restrict the moves of the players to pure moves. We identify a pure move a ∈ Γ i (s) available to player i ∈ {1, 2} at a state s with a deterministic distribution that plays a with probability 1. The deterministic setting. The deterministic setting is obtained by considering deterministic game structures, with players restricted to playing pure moves.
Predecessor operators.
Given a valuation f ∈ F, a state s ∈ S, and two mixed moves x 1 ∈ D 1 (s) and x 2 ∈ D 2 (s), we define the expectation of f from s under x 1 , x 2 :
For a game structure G, for i ∈ {1, 2} we define the valuation transformer Pre i : F → F by, for all f ∈ F and s ∈ S,
Intuitively, Pre i (f )(s) is the maximal expectation player i can achieve of f after one step from s: this is the classical "one-day" or "next-stage" operator of the theory of repeated games [12] . We also define a deterministic version of this operator, in which players are forced to play pure moves:
2.3.
Quantitative µ-calculus. We consider the set of properties expressed by the quantitative µ-calculus (qµ). As discussed in [16, 7, 21] , a large set of properties can be encoded in qµ, spanning from basic properties such as maximal reachability and safety probability, to the maximal probability of satisfying a general ω-regular specification. Syntax. The syntax of quantitative µ-calculus is defined with respect to the set of observation variables V as well as a set MVars of calculus variables, which are distinct from the observation variables in V. The syntax is given as follows:
for constants c ∈ [0, 1], observation variables v ∈ V, and calculus variables Z ∈ MVars. In the formulas µZ. ϕ and νZ. ϕ, we furthermore require that all occurrences of the bound variable Z in ϕ occur in the scope of an even number of occurrences of the complement operator ¬. A formula ϕ is closed if every calculus variable Z in ϕ occurs in the scope of a quantifier µZ or νZ. From now on, with abuse of notation, we denote by qµ the set of closed formulas of qµ. A formula is a player i formula, for i ∈ {1, 2}, if ϕ does not contain the pre ∼i operator; we denote with qµ i the syntactic subset of qµ consisting only of closed player i formulas. A formula is in positive form if the negation appears only in front of observation variables, i.e., in the context ¬v; we denote with qµ + and qµ + i the subsets of qµ and qµ i consisting only of positive formulas.
We remark that the fixpoint operators µ and ν will not be needed to achieve our results on the logical characterization of game relations. They have been included in the calculus because they allow the expression of many interesting properties, such as safety, reachability, and in general, ω-regular properties. The operators ⊕ and ⊖, on the other hand, are necessary for our results. Semantics. A variable valuation ξ: MVars → F is a function that maps every variable Z ∈ MVars to a valuation in F. We write ξ[Z → f ] for the valuation that agrees with ξ on all variables, except that Z is mapped to f . Given a game structure G and a variable valuation ξ, every formula ϕ of the quantitative µ-calculus defines a valuation [[ϕ] ] G ξ ∈ F (the superscript G is omitted if the game structure is clear from the context):
where i ∈ {1, 2}. The existence of the fixpoints is guaranteed by the monotonicity and continuity of all operators and can be computed by Picard iteration [7] . If ϕ is closed, [ 
Example 1. Given a set T ⊆ S, the characteristic valuation T of T is defined by T(s) = 1 if s ∈ T , and T(s) = 0 otherwise. With this notation, the maximal probability with which player i ∈ {1, 2} can ensure eventually reaching T ⊆ S is given by [[µZ.(T ∨ pre i (Z))]], and the maximal probability with which player i can guarantee staying in T forever is given by [[νZ.(T ∧ pre i (Z))]] (see, e.g., [7] ). The first property is called a reachability property, the second a safety property.
Metrics
We are interested in developing a metric on states of a game structure that captures an approximate notion of equivalence: states close in the metric should yield similar values to the players for any winning objective. Specifically, we are interested in defining a bisimulation metric [≃ g ] ∈ M such that for any game structure G and states s, t of G, the following continuity property holds:
In particular, the kernel of the metric, that is, states at distance 0, are equivalent: each player can get exactly the same value from either state for any objective. Notice that in defining the metric independent of a player, we are expecting our metrics to be reciprocal, that is, invariant under a change of player. Reciprocity is expected to hold since the underlying games we consider are determined -for any game, the value obtained by player 2 is one minus the value obtained by player 1-and yields canonical metrics on games. Thus, our metrics will generalize equivalence and refinement relations that have been studied on MDPs and in the deterministic setting. To underline the connection between classical equivalences and the metrics we develop, we write [s ≃ g t] for [≃ g ](s, t), so that the desired property of the bisimulation metric can be stated as
Metrics of this type have already been developed for Markov decision processes (MDPs) [30, 10] . Our construction of metrics for games starts from an analysis of these constructions.
Metrics for MDPs.
We consider the case of 1-MDPs; the case for 2-MDPs is symmetrical. Throughout this subsection, we fix a 1-MDP S, [·], Moves, Γ 1 , Γ 2 , δ . Before we present the metric correspondent of probabilistic simulation, we first rephrase classical probabilistic (bi)simulation on MDPs [18, 14, 25, 26] as a fixpoint of a relation transformer. As a first step, we lift relations between states to relations between distributions. Given a relation R ⊆ S × S and two distributions p, q ∈ Dist(S), we let p ⊑ R q if there is a function ∆ :
To rephrase probabilistic simulation, we define the relation transformer F : 2 S×S → 2 S×S as follows. For all relations R ⊆ S × S and s, t ∈ S, we let (s, t) ∈ F (R) iff
for all states s, t ∈ S. Probabilistic simulation is the greatest fixpoint of (3.2); probabilistic bisimulation is the greatest symmetrical fixpoint of (3.2).
To obtain a metric equivalent of probabilistic simulation, we lift the above fixpoint from relations (subsets of S 2 ) to metrics (maps
) and δ(t, y 1 ) with respect to the metric d. We will show later how to define such a distribution distance. For s, t ∈ S, we let
In this definition, the ∀ and ∃ of (3.2) have been replaced by sup and inf, respectively. Since equivalent states should have distance 0, the simulation metric in MDPs is defined as the least (rather than greatest) fixpoint of (3.3) [30, 10] . Similarly, the bisimulation metric is defined as the least symmetrical fixpoint of (3.3). For a distance d ∈ M and two distributions p, q ∈ Dist(S), the distribution distance D(p, q)(d) is a measure of how much "work" we have to do to make p look like q, given that moving a unit of probability mass from s ∈ S to t ∈ S has cost d(s, t). 
Equivalently, we can define D(p, q)(d) via the dual of the above LP problem [30] . Given a
for all s, t ∈ S. Then the dual formulation is:
The constraint C(d) on the valuation k, states that the value of k across states cannot differ by more than d. This means, intuitively, that k behaves like the valuation of a qµ formula: as we will see, the logical characterization implies that d is a bound for the difference in valuation of qµ formulas across states. Indeed, the logical characterization of the metrics is proved by constructing formulas whose valuation approximate that of the optimal k. Plugging (3.4) into (3.3), we obtain:
We can interpret this definition as follows. State t is trying to simulate state s (this is a definition of a simulation metric). First, state s chooses a mixed move x 1 , attempting to make simulation as hard as possible; then, state t chooses a mixed move y 1 , trying to match the effect of x 1 . Once x 1 and y 1 have been chosen, the resulting distance between s and t is equal to the maximal difference in expectation, for moves x 1 and y 1 , of a valuation k ∈ C(d). We call the metric transformer H 1MDP post the a posteriori metric transformer: the valuation k in (3.5) is chosen after the moves x 1 and y 1 are chosen. We can define an a priori metric transformer, where k is chosen before x 1 and y 1 :
Intuitively, in the a priori transformer, first a valuation k ∈ C(d) is chosen. Then, state t must simulate state s with respect to the expectation of k. State s chooses a move x 1 , trying to maximize the difference in expectations, and state t chooses a move y 1 , trying to minimize it. The distance between s and t is then equal to the difference in the resulting expectations of k. Theorem 3.1 below states that for MDPs, a priori and a posteriori simulation metrics coincide. In the next section, we will see that this is not the case for games.
prio . Proof. Consider two states s, t ∈ S, and a metric d ∈ M. We have to prove that
In the left-hand side, we can exchange the two outer sups. Then, noticing that the difference in expectation is bi-linear in k and y 1 for a fixed x 1 , that y 1 is a probability distribution, and that k is chosen from a compact convex subset, we apply the generalized minimax theorem [28] 
3.2.
Metrics for Concurrent Games. We now extend the simulation and bisimulation metrics from MDPs to general game structures. As we shall see, unlike for MDPs, the a priori and the a posteriori metrics do not coincide over games. In particular, we show that the a priori formulation satisfies both a tight logical characterization as well as reciprocity while, perhaps surprisingly, the more natural a posteriori version does not.
A posteriori metrics are defined via the metric transformer H ⊑ 1 : M → M as follows, for all d ∈ M and s, t ∈ S:
A priori metrics are defined by bringing the sup k outside. Precisely, we define a metric transformer H 1 : M → M as follows, for all d ∈ M and s, t ∈ S: 
The result then follows from the monotonicity of the operators sup
On the basis of this lemma, we can define the least fixpoints of H 1 and H ⊑ 1 , which will yield our game simulation and bisimulation metrics. • The a posteriori game bisimulation metric [ ∼ = 1 ] is the least symmetrical fixpoint of H ⊑ 1 . By exchanging the roles of the players, we define the metric transformers H 2 and H ⊑ 2 , and the metrics
We note that the a posteriori simulation metric [⊑ 1 ] has been introduced in [6, 19] . We also note that the a posteriori bisimulation metric [ ∼ = i ] can be defined as the least fixpoint of H∼ =i : M → M, defined for all d ∈ M and i ∈ {1, 2} by
where Opp(d) =d denotes the opposite of a metric d. Similarly, the a priori bisimulation metric [≃ i ] can be defined as the least fixpoint of
(3.11) We wish to show that the metrics of Definition 3.3 can be computed via Picard iteration. To this end, it is necessary to show that the operators H ⊑ 1 and H 1 on the lattice (M, ≤) are upper semi-continuous. In fact, a very similar proof shows that the operators are lower semi-continuous, and thus, continuous; we omit the proof of this more general fact as it is not required for the desired result about the applicability of Picard iteration. We first prove the result for H 1 . We need to prove that
follows from the monotonicity of H 1 (Lemma 3.2). In the other direction, we will show that for all
In fact, let k * ∈ C(d * ) be such that
By employing x 1 (s) at all s ∈ S, player 1 can guarantee
which together with (3.13) leads to (3.12). In turn, (3.12) yields the result. We can prove the result for H ⊑ 1 following a similar argument. Precisely, in one direction,
follows from the monotonicity of H ⊑ 1 (Lemma 3.2). In the other direction, we will show that for all 
We have
Proof. The statements follow from the definitions of the metrics, and from Lemmas 3.2 and 3.4.
We now show some basic properties of these metrics. First, we show that the a priori fixpoints give a (directed) metric, i.e., they are non-negative and satisfy the triangle inequality. We also prove that the a priori and a posteriori metrics are distinct. We then focus on the a priori metrics, and show, through our results, that they are the natural metrics for concurrent games. 
Proof. We prove the following statement: if d ∈ M is a directed metric, then:
The theorem then follows by induction on the Picard iteration with which the a priori and a posteriori metrics can be computed (Theorem 3.5). We prove the result first for the a priori metric. To prove the triangle inequality, we observe that
Thus, we obtain
leading to the result.
For the a posteriori metric, let d ′ = H ⊑ 1 (d); again, we can prove d ′ ≥ 0 as in the a priori case. To prove the triangle inequality for d ′ , for s, t ∈ S, and for distributions x 1 ∈ D 1 (s) and y 1 ∈ D 1 (t), it is convenient to let
With this notation, for s, t, u ∈ S, we have z 1 )(s, u) .
(3.16)
Intuitively, the quantity G(x 1 , z 1 )(s, u) is the distance between s and u computed in the 2-MDP obtained when player 1 plays x 1 at s and z 1 at u. As a consequence of Theorem 3.1 (interpreted over 2-MDPs), and of the previous proof for the a-priori case, we have that
for all x 1 ∈ D 1 (s), y 1 ∈ D 1 (t), and z 1 ∈ D 1 (u). This observation will be useful in the following. For any ǫ > 0, let x * 1 realize the sup in (3.16) within ǫ, that is, inf 18) and let z * 1 realize the inf of the left-hand side of (3.18) also within ǫ. Intuitively, x * 1 is the player-1 distribution at s that is hardest to imitate from u, and z * 1 is the best imitation of x * 1 available at u. In the same fashion, let y * 1 realize the inf within ǫ in inf y 1 ∈D 1 (t) G(x * 1 , y 1 )(s, t), and let z ′ 1 realize the inf within ǫ in inf
In intuitive terms, y * 1 is the imitator of x * 1 in t, and z ′ 1 is the imitator of y * 1 in u. We consider two cases. If [s ≡ u] = 1, then we are sure that the triangle inequality 19) holds. Otherwise, note that
Since x * 1 is not necessarily the distribution at s that is hardest to imitate from t, and since y * 1 is not necessarily the distribution at t that is hardest to imitate from u, we also have:
Since the triangle inequality holds for MDPs, as stated by (3.17), we have
Since z * 1 is the best imitator of x * 1 at u, we also have
which together with (3.22) yields
From the choice of x * 1 , this finally leads to
for all ǫ > 0, which yields the desired triangle inequality (3.19). The tables above show the transition probabilities from states t and s to states w and u for pure moves of the two players. The row player is player 1 and the column player is player 2. The line below is the two dimensional probability simplex that shows the transition probabilities induced by convex combinations of pure moves of the two players.
3.3.
A priori and a posteriori metrics are distinct. First, we show that a priori and a posteriori metrics are distinct in general: the a priori metric never exceeds the a posteriori one, and there are concurrent games where it is strictly smaller. Intuitively, this can be explained as follows. Simulation entails trying to simulate the expectation of a valuation k, as we see from (3.8), (3.9) . It is easier to simulate a state s from a state t if the valuation is known in advance, as in a priori metrics (3.9), than if the valuation k is chosen after all the moves have been chosen, as in a posteriori metrics (3.8).
As a special case, we shall see that equality holds for turn-based game structures, in addition to MDPs as we have seen in the previous subsection. Proof. The first assertion is a consequence of the fact that, for all functions f : IR 2 → IR, we have sup x inf y f (x, y) ≤ inf y sup x f (x, y). By repeated applications of this, we can show that, for all d ∈ M, we have H (d) ≤ H ⊑ (d) (with pointwise ordering). The result then follows from the monotonicity of H and H ⊑ .
For the second assertion, we give an example where a priori distances are strictly less than a posteriori distances. Consider a game with states S = {s, t, u, w}. States u and w are sink states with [u ≡ w] = 1; states s and t are such that [s ≡ t] = 0. At states s and t, player 2 has moves {f, g}. Player-1 has a single move {a} at state s, and moves {b, c} at state t. The moves from s and t lead to u and w with transition probabilities indicated in Figure 1 . In the figure, the point b, f indicates the probability of going to u and w when the move pair (b, f ) is played, with δ(s, b, f )(u) + δ(s, b, f )(w) = 1; similarly for the other move pairs. The thick line segment between the points a, f and a, g represents the transition probabilities arising when player 1 plays move a, and player 2 plays a mixed move (a mix of f and g).
We show that, in this game, we have [s ⊑ 1 t] > 0. Consider the metric d where d(u, w) = 1 (recall that [u ≡ w] = 1, and note the other distances do not matter, since u, w are the only two destinations). We need to show
Consider any mixed move y 1 = αb + (1 − α)c, where b, c are the moves available to player 1 at t, and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. If α ≥ 1 2 , choose move f from t as y 2 , and choose k(w) = 1, k(u) = 0. Otherwise, choose move g from t as y 2 , and choose k(w) = 0, k(u) = 1. With these choices, the transition probability δ(t, y 1 , y 2 ) will fall outside of the segment [(a, f ), (a, g)] in Figure 1 . Thus, with the choice of k above, we ensure that the difference in (3.25) is always positive.
To show that in the game we have [s 1 t] = 0, it suffices to show (given that [ The last assertion of the theorem is proved in the same way as Theorem 3.1.
3.4.
Reciprocity of a priori metric. The previous theorem establishes that the a priori and a posteriori metrics are in general distinct. We now prove that it is the a priori metric, rather than the a posteriori one, that enjoys reciprocity, and that provides a (quantitative) logical characterization of qµ. We begin by considering reciprocity. 
Proof. For the first assertion, it suffices to show that, for all d ∈ M, and states s, t ∈ S, we have
We proceed as follows:
The step from (3.26) to (3.27) uses Pre 1 (k)(s) = 1 − Pre 2 (1 − k)(s) [32, 7] , and the step from (3.27) to (3.28) uses the change of variables k → 1 − k. For the second assertion, consider again the game of Figure 1 . We will show that [t ⊑ 2 s] = 0. Together with [s ⊑ 1 t] > 0, as shown in the proof of Theorem 3.7, this leads to the result. To obtain the result, we will prove that for all d, we have:
where we have used the fact that player 1 at s plays x 1 = a. Any mixed move y 2 ∈ D 2 (t) can be written as y 2 = αf + (1 − α)g for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Choose y 1 = αc + (1 − α)b, and
Under this choice of mixed moves, we have:
As the probabilities of transitions to w are equal from t and s, we obtain that for all k ∈ C(d), we have E
(k) = 0, as desired. For the third assertion, we consider a modified version of the game depicted in Figure 1 , obtained by adding two new moves to player 2 at state t, namely f ′ and g ′ . We define the transition probabilities of these new moves by
To prove [s ⊑ 1 t] > 0, we can proceed as in the proof of Theorem 3.7, noting that we can choose y 2 as in that proof (this is possible, as player 2 at t has more moves available in the modified game). This leads to 
We can write any mixed move x 2 ∈ D 2 (s) as x 2 = αf + (1 − α)g. We can then choose y 2 = αf ′ + (1 − α)g ′ , and since at t under f ′ , g ′ the transition probabilities do not depend on the mixed move y 1 chosen by player 1, we have that the transition probabilities from s and t match for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
To show that [t ⊑ 2 s] = 0, we need to show that:
Any mixed move y 2 ∈ D 2 (t) can be written as
for some α, β, γ ∈ [0, 1]. We choose x 2 and y 1 as follows:
With these mixed moves, we have δ(s, a, x 2 ) = δ(t, y 1 , y 2 ), leading to the result. 3.5. Logical characterization of a priori metric. We now prove that qµ provides a logical characterization for the a priori metrics. We first state and prove two lemmas that lead to the desired result. The proof of the lemmas use ideas from [19] and [10] . We recall from Theorem 3.5 that we can compute [ 1 ] via Picard iteration, with d n = H n 1 (0) being the n-iterate.
We prove the existence of a logical characterization via a sequence of the following two lemmas. The first lemma proves that a priori metrics provide a bound for the difference in value of qµ-formulas. , and for all s, t ∈ S, we have
(2) For all ϕ ∈ qµ, and for all s, t ∈ S, we have
Proof. We prove the first assertion. The proof is by induction on the structure of a (possibly open) formula ϕ ∈ qµ + 1 . Call a variable valuation ξ bounded if, for all variables Z ∈ MVars and states s, t, we have that ξ(Z)(s) − ξ(Z)(t) ≤ [s 1 t]. We prove by induction that for all s, t ∈ S, for all bounded variable valuations ξ, we have
For clarity, we sometimes omit writing the variable valuation ξ.
The base case for constants is trivial, and the case for observation variables follows since [s ≡ t] ≤ [s 1 t]. The case for variables Z ∈ MVars follows from the assumption of bounded variable valuations. For ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 , assume the induction hypothesis for ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , and note that
The proof for ∧ is similar. For ϕ 1 ⊕ c and ϕ 1 ⊖ c, we have by induction hypothesis that
, and so the "shifted versions" also satisfy the same bound.
For the induction step for pre 1 , assume the induction hypothesis for ϕ, and note that we can choose k ∈ C(
We have, for all s, t ∈ S,
where the last inequality follows by noting that [ 1 ] is a fixpoint of H 1 . The proof for the fixpoint operators is performed by considering their Picard iterates. We consider the case µZ.ϕ, the proof for νZ.ϕ is similar. Let ξ be a bounded variable valuation. Then, the variable valuation ξ 0 = ξ[Z → 0] is also bounded, and by induction hypothesis, the formula ϕ when evaluated in the variable valuation ξ 0 satisfies
(3.30)
Now consider the variable valuation
. From Equation (3.30), we get that ξ 1 is bounded, and again, by induction hypothesis, we have that
By the above argument, each variable valuation ξ k is bounded, and so for every k ≥ 0, we have
Taking the limit, as k → ∞, we have that
The proof of the second assertion can be done along the same lines, using the symmetry of ≃ g . The proof is again by induction on the structure of the formula. In particular, (3.29) can be proved for either player: for n ≥ 0 and i ∈ {1, 2},
Negation can be dealt with by noting that
, and by using the symmetry of ≃ g ; the other cases are similar.
The second lemma states that the qµ formulas can attain the distance computed by the simulation metric.
Lemma 3.10. The following assertions hold for all game structures G, and for all states s, t of G.
The base case is trivial. For the induction step, the distance is:
The challenge is to show that, for all s, t ∈ S, we can construct a formula ψ st that witnesses the distance within an arbitrary ε > 0:
To this end, let k ⋆ be the value of k that realizes the sup in (3.33) within ε/4. By induction hypothesis, for each pair of states s ′ and t ′ we can choose ϕ ′
We now prove that:
Equality (3.37) is immediate from (3.36). We prove (3.38) as follows. We can rewrite (3.35) as
Plugging this relation into (3.39), we obtain
Plugging this relation into (3.36) evaluated at t ′ , we obtain
which proves (3.38). Define now ϕ s ′ = t ′ ϕ s ′ t ′ . From (3.37) and (3.38) we have
Define then ϕ = s ′ ϕ s ′ . From (3.42), (3.43), we have that
for all s ′ ∈ S. As formula ψ st , we propose thus to take the formula pre(ϕ). From (3.44), we have that
. By comparison with (3.33), and by the fact that k ⋆ realizes the sup within ε/4, we finally have (3.34), as desired.
From these two lemmas, we can conclude that [[qµ] ] provides a logical characterization for the a priori metrics, as stated by the next theorem.
Theorem 3.11. The following assertions hold for all game structures G, and for all states s, t of G:
We note that, due to Theorem 3.7, an analogous result does not hold for the a posteriori metrics. Together with the lack of reciprocity of the a posteriori metrics, this is a strong indication that the a priori metrics, and not the a posteriori ones, are the "natural" metrics on concurrent games.
Our metrics are not characterized by the probabilistic temporal logic PCTL [13, 3] . In fact, the values of PCTL formulas can change from true to false when certain probabilities cross given thresholds, so that PCTL formulas can have different boolean values on games that are very close in transition probabilities, and hence, very close in our metric. Quantitative metrics such as the ones developed in this paper are suited to quantitative-valued formulas, such as those of qµ.
3.6. The Kernel. The kernel of the metric [≃ g ] defines an equivalence relation ≃ g on the states of a game structure: s ≃ g t iff [s ≃ g t] = 0. We call this the game bisimulation relation. Notice that by the reciprocity property of ≃ g , the game bisimulation relation is canonical: ≃ 1 = ≃ 2 = ≃ g . Similarly, we define the game simulation preorder s 1 t as the kernel of the directed metric [ 1 ] , that is, s 1 t iff [s 1 t] = 0. Alternatively, it is possible to define 1 and ≃ g directly. Given a relation R ⊆ S × S, let B(R) ⊆ F consist of all valuations k ∈ F such that, for all s, t ∈ S, if sRt then k(s) ≤ k(t). We have the following result.
Theorem 3.12. Given a game structure G, the relation 1 (resp. ≃ 1 ) can be characterized as the largest (resp. largest symmetrical) relation R such that, for all states s, t with sRt, we have s ≡ t and
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the computation of the fixpoint relation R. We first present the case for 1 . Call R n the n-th iterate of the simulation relation R, and let d n be the n-th iterate of [ 1 ], as in Theorem 3.5. We prove by induction that, for all states s, t ∈ S, we have sR n t iff d n (s, t) = 0. We define d 0 (s, t) = [s ≡ t]. The base case is then immediate because sR 0 t iff d 0 (s, t) = 0. Consider the induction step, for n ≥ 0, and consider any states s, t ∈ S. Assume first that d n+1 (s, t) > 0: then, it is easy to show that we can find a value for k in (3.45) that witnesses (s, t) ∈ R n+1 , since the constraints on k due to B(R n ) are weaker than those due to C(d n ). Conversely, assume that there is a k ∈ B(R n ) that witnesses (s, t) ∈ R n+1 . Then, by scaling all k values so that they are all smaller than the smallest non-zero value of d n (s ′ , t ′ ) for any s ′ , t ′ ∈ S, we can find a k ′ ∈ C(d n ) which also witnesses d n+1 (s, t) > 0, as required.
The case for ≃ g is analogous, due to the similarity of the Picard iterations (3.14) for 
3.7.
Relation between Game Metrics and (Bi-)simulation Metrics. The a priori metrics assume an adversarial relationship between the players. We show that, on turnbased games, the a priori bisimulation metric coincides with the classical bisimulation metric where the players cooperate. We define such "cooperative" simulation and bisimulation metrics [ 12 ] and [≃ 12 ] as the metric analog of classical (bi)simulation [22, 25] . We define the metric transformers H 12 : M → M and H ≃ 12 : M → M, for all metrics d ∈ M and s, t ∈ S, by:
The metrics [ 12 ] and [≃ 12 ] are defined as the least fixed points of H 12 and H ≃ 12 respectively. The kernel of these metrics define the classical probabilistic simulation and bisimulation relations. Proof. For the first part, since we have turn-based games, only one player has a choice of moves at each state. We say that a state s belongs to player i ∈ {1, 2} if player ∼i has only one move at s. First, notice that due to the presence of the variable turn, the metric distance between states belonging to different players is always 1, for all the metrics we consider. Thus, we focus on the metric distances between states belonging to the same player. Consider two player 1 states s, t ∈ S. Since player 1 has no choice of moves at state s, the maximum probability with which player 1 can guarantee a transition to either state u or state v is 0. But from state t, by playing moves a, b with probability 1 2 each, player 1 can guarantee reaching states u and v with probability If we consider Markov decision processes (MDPs), we have that on i-MDPs, the metric i coincides with 12 , since player ∼i has no moves, for i ∈ {1, 2}. On the other hand, the metric ∼i provides no information on 12 . Proof. From the definitions of H 1 and H 12 , restricted to MDPs, where only one player has a choice of moves, the first assertion follows. The second and third assertions are proved by the deterministic 2-MDP in Figure 4 , where again [s ≡ t] = 0 and [u ≡ v] = 1. For the second assertion we note that since d(u, v) = 1, for any choice of k ∈ C(d), player 1 cannot get a higher expectation of k from state s when compared to state t, because at state s, player 2 always has a move that will lead to a state yielding a lower k expectation. Therefore, [s 1 t] = 0. Further, for k(v) = 1 and k(u) = 0, which satisfies the constraints on k, we have no moves for either player from state t, which implies [s 12 t] = 1.
We prove the third assertion by showing that, for the 2-MDP of Figure 4 , we have [t 1 s] > [t 12 s] (which is the third assertion, with s and t exchanged). Note that when player 2 cooperates, the expectation of any k ∈ C(d) from state s is always at least as much as the expectation from state t. Thus [t 12 s] = 0. Finally, there exists a k ∈ C(d), with k(u) = 1 and k(v) = 0, for which [t 1 s] = 1, which completes the proof.
3.8. Computation. We now show that the metrics are computable to any degree of precision. This follows since the definition of the distance between two states of a given game, as the least fixpoint of the metric transformer (3.9), can be written as a formula in the theory of reals, which is decidable [29] . Since the distance between two states may not be rational, we can only guarantee an approximate computation in general.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the states of G are labeled {s 1 , . . . , s n } for some n ∈ IN. The construction is standard (see, e.g., [7] ), we recapitulate the main steps. We denote by R the real-closed field (IR, +, ·, 0, 1, ≤) of the reals with addition and multiplication. An atomic formula is an expression of the form p > 0 or p = 0 where p is a (possibly) multi-variate polynomial with integer coefficients. An elementary formula is constructed from atomic formulas by the grammar
where a is an atomic formula, ∧ denotes conjunction, ∨ denotes disjunction, ¬ denotes complementation, and ∃ and ∀ denote existential and universal quantification respectively. We write ϕ → ϕ ′ as shorthand for ¬ϕ ∨ ϕ ′ . The semantics of elementary formulas are given in a standard way [4] . A variable x is free in the formula ϕ if it is not in the scope of a quantifier ∃x or ∀x. An elementary sentence is a formula with no free variables. The theory of real-closed fields is decidable [29] .
We introduce additional atomic formulas as syntactic sugar: for polynomials p 1 and p 2 , we write p 1 = p 2 for p 1 − p 2 = 0, p 1 > p 2 for p 1 − p 2 > 0, and p 1 ≥ p 2 for p 1 − p 2 = 0 ∨ p 1 − p 2 > 0. Also, we write p 1 ≤ p 2 for p 2 ≥ p 1 and p 1 < p 2 for p 2 > p 1 . Let x, y denote vectors of variables, where the dimensions of the vectors will be clear from the context. For ∼∈ {=, ≤, ≥}, we write x ∼ y for the pointwise ordering, that is, if i x i ∼ y i . A subset C ⊆ IR m is definable in R if there exists an elementary formula ϕ C ( x) such that for any
there exists an elementary formula ϕ f ( y, x) with free variables y, x such that for all constants y 0 ∈ IR m and x 0 ∈ IR k the formula ϕ f ( y 0 , x 0 ) is true in R iff y 0 = f ( x 0 ). We start with some simple observations about definability. 
is definable in R.
Proof. For part (a), let ϕ 1 ( y, x) and ϕ 2 ( y, x) be formulas defining f 1 and f 2 respectively. Then, f 1 − f 2 is defined by the formula
and f 1 ⊔ f 2 is defined by the formula
For part (b), let ϕ f ( z, x, y) define f , where x is of dimension k, y of dimension l, and z of dimension m, respectively. Let ψ C ( x) define C. Then, the following formula with free variables z, y (call it ϕ( z, y)) states that z is an upper bound of f ( x, y) for all x ∈ C:
and sup C f is defined by the formula with free variables z, y given by: 
is definable for d ∈ M and states s and t of G. Consider the set of free variables {y(s, t), d(s, t) | s, t ∈ S}, where d is a vector of n 2 free variables defining the metric d, and where y is a vector of n 2 variables. Let ϕ(y, d) be a formula in R, with free variables in the above set, such that ϕ(y, d) is true iff y(s, t) = H 1 (d)(s, t) holds for all s, t ∈ S. Then the formula ϕ * (y) with free variables y, defined as:
defines a fixpoint of H 1 (d). Finally, the formula ψ(y), given by
defines the least fixpoint of H 1 (again, y ′ = {y ′ (s, t) | s, t ∈ S} is a matrix of n 2 variables, and y ≤ y ′ iff y(s, t) ≤ y ′ (s, t) for all s, t ∈ S). Thus, ψ(y) is true iff y(s, t) 
is valid, and this can be decided since R is decidable.
A similar construction shows that the question whether |[s ≃ g t] − v| < ǫ, is decidable for states s, t and rationals v, ǫ: we ensure that y is a symmetric fixpoint by conjoining to ϕ * (y) constraints y(s, t) = y(t, s) for all states s, t.
If the formula ∃y.(ψ(y) ∧ y(s, t) = 0), where we assert that the distance between s and t is zero, is valid, we can conclude that s 1 t. This implies that the relation s 1 t is decidable for any game structure G and states s and t of G. A similar construction for ≃ g shows that the relation s ≃ g t is also decidable for any game structure G and states s, t of G.
or only pure moves are allowed. For a relation R ⊆ S × S, for M ∈ {Γ, D}, for all s, t ∈ S and i ∈ {1, 2} consider the following conditions:
• (loc) s R t implies s ≡ t.
• (M -i-altsim) s R t implies ∀x i ∈ M i (s) . ∃y i ∈ M i (t) . ∀y ∼i ∈ M ∼i (t) . ∃x ∼i ∈ M ∼i (s) . δ(s, x 1 , x 2 ) ⊑ R δ(t, y 1 , y 2 ); We then define the following relations:
• For i ∈ {1, 2} and M ∈ {Γ, D}, player-i M -alternating simulation ⊑ M i is the largest relation that satisfies (loc) and (M -i-altsim).
• For i ∈ {1, 2} and M ∈ {Γ, D}, player-i M -alternating bisimulation ∼ = M i is the largest symmetrical relation that satisfies (loc) and (M -i-altsim). Over deterministic game structures, the definitions of ⊑ Γ i and ∼ = Γ i coincide with the alternating simulation and bisimulation relations of [2] . In fact, ⊑ Γ i and ∼ = Γ i capture the deterministic semantics of qµ, and thus in some sense generalize the results of [2] to probabilistic game structures. In particular, the D-relations are too fine, and the Γ-relations are incomparable with the relations i and ≃ g , for i ∈ {1, 2}. We prove these negative results first for the D-relations. They follow from Theorem 3.7 and 3.11. the successor state, otherwise it is v. Thus, the game from s is the usual "penny-matching" game; the game from t is a version of "penny-matching" with 3-sided pennies. It can be seen that s ⊑ Γ 1 t. On the other hand, we have s 1 t. Indeed, from state s, by playing both a and b with probability 1 2 , player 1 can ensure that the probability of a transition to u is 1 2 . On the other hand, from state t, player 1 can achieve at most probability 1 3 of reaching u (this maximal probability is achieved by playing all of a, b, c with probability 1 3 ). The result then follows using Theorem 3.11. The second assertion is proved via the game in Figure 6 . We have s ⊑ Γ 1 t: clearly, player-1's move c at state s cannot be mimicked at t when the game is restricted to pure moves. On the other hand, we have s 1 t: since the move c at s can be imitated via the mixed move that plays both a and b at t with probability 
Conclusions
We have introduced the metrics and relations that constitute the natural generalizations of simulation and bisimulation to stochastic games on graphs. These relations and metrics are tight, in the sense that the distance between two states is equal to the maximum difference in value that properties of the quantitative µ-calculus can assume at the two states: in other words, the relations characterize quantitative µ-calculus, in the same way in which ordinary bisimulation characterizes µ-calculus. The paper also provided a full picture of the connection between the new metrics and relations, and the relations previously considered for games.
The main point left open by the paper concerns the algorithms for the computation of the relations and metrics. The algorithms we provided rely on the decidability of the theory of reals; it is an open question whether more efficient, and more direct, algorithms exist, for the metrics or at least for the relations.
